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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JARVIS CLARK MAYCOCK,
BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANT

Defendant/Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 950661-CA
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(f) provides this Court's
jurisdiction over this appeal, which appeal is from the final
order of the Fourth Judicial District, Juab County, State of Utah
entered on September 12, 1995.

Counsel for Mr. Maycock filed a

timely notice of appeal on 10th, 1995.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1, Did the officer who claimed to have smelled an odor of
burnt marijuana but actually found no marijuana lack probable
cause\reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment to search
appellant's vehicle or will the inevitable discovery doctrine
allow admission of the evidence?
2. Did exigent circumstances exist to justify a warrantless
search as required by the Utah and United States Constitutions?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 25th, 1994, the State of Utah charged Maycock in
a three count indictment alleging as Count I, a violation of
Utah's Controlled Substance Act by knowingly possessing
methamphetamine contrary to Utah Code Ann. 58-37-8(2) (a) (I),
1953.

Maycock was also charged with Count II, driving under the

influence of drugs contrary to Utah Code Ann. 44-6-44, 1953 and
Count III, possession of drug paraphernalia contrary to Utah Code
Ann. 58-37a-5, 1953.

Count II was dismissed prior to trial.

Thereafter, at trial on June 26, 1995, Maycock made a motion
to suppress evidence.

The motion was denied.

On July 16, 1995,

Maycock was found guilty by a jury of Counts I and III as listed
above.
Preserving his right to appeal the trial court's denial of
his motion to suppress, Maycock was sentenced on Count I to the
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Utah State Prison for an indeterminate amount of time not to
exceed five (5) years, plus pay a fine in the amount of $5,000
and on Count III to the Juab County Jail for six (6) months.
Execution of the sentence was suspended and Maycock was placed on
probation for a period of 36 months subject to

certain terms and

conditions.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On November 24th, 1992, Maycock was arrested during a
traffic stop by Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Fred Swain ("Swain").
He was subsequently charged with possession of methamphetamine in
violation of Utah's Controlled Substance Act, Utah Code Ann. 5837-8 (2)(a)(I), 1953. Maycock was also charged with driving
under the influence of drugs in violation of Utah Code Ann. 41-644, 1953 and possession of drug paraphernalia contrary to Utah
Code Ann. 41-6-44, 1953. The charge of driving under the
influence of drugs was dropped prior to trial.

..<

At a trial held in the Fourth Judicial District Court for
Juab County, State of Utah on January 10th, 1992, the following
facts were revealed:
On November 24th, 1995, at approximately 9:20 a.m., Maycock
was driving his vehicle, a white Toyota pickup with a shell on
it, near milepost 217 on Interstate 15 (T at 10, 48)1. Maycock

i The statement of facts is taken form the trial transcript and the preliminary hearing transcript. Pages of the trial
transcript are cited herein as i%(T.)." .
3

was the sole occupant of the vehicle.
Swain was also traveling on 1-15 on November 24th, 1994, at
approximately the same time and location as Maycock (T at 10).
Swain stopped Maycock for not having a license plate on the front
bumper of his vehicle (T at 10). Swain approached the driver's
side of the vehicle and requested Maycockfs driver's license and
registration (T at 10). When Maycock rolled down his window and
gave Swain his drivers license and registration, Swain alleges
that he smelled the odor of burnt marijuana emanating from inside
the vehicle (T at 10). Swain received Maycockfs driver's license
and registration and asked Maycock to exit the vehicle (T at 12) .
A later check of the vehicle's registration determined that the
car was registered to Jarvis Maycock.

Swain

requested that he

be allowed to search the vehicle. Maycock said no (T at 13).
Swain proceeded to search the vehicle because, he said, "I could
smell marijuana" (T at 12, 2 6).
During his search of the vehicle, Swain first found a bottle
of Visine in the driver's side door pouch. (T at 27). As Swain
was searching the vehicle, Maycock remarked that he was cold and
asked if he could sit in the vehicle.

Swain said he did not want

Maycock in the vehicle "for safety reasons" and asked him if he
would like a jacket. Maycock said yes and before handing Maycock
a jacket that was lying on the passenger seat, Swain searched the
jacket. Next Swain found a film container and the casing of a pen
with the end cut off which Swain described as a "snorting tube"
4

(T at 27, 28). On the edge of the snorting tube, Swain believes
he observed an unidentified orange substance.

Next, Swain found

in the jacket a razor blade, a clip, and a red pipe with what he
believed was marijuana residue inside (T at 30, 31). This belief
was never confirmed by a lab analysis of the pipe.

The film

container found in the jacket pocket contained two small rocks of
what a Trooper swain believed to be methamphetamine.

A lab

analysis of the substance at the State Crime Lab confirmed that
the substance was approximately 130 milligrams of
methamphetamine. (T at 36) .
When Trooper Swain asked Maycock about the contents of the
jacket, Maycock replied that the jacket was not his and that it
belonged to a person named Kelly Ebell (T at 37, 38) . Maycock
said that he did not know the phone number or address of the
person (T. at 37).
Swain then handcuffed Maycock and placed him in his patrol
car and then conducted an inventory search of the vehicle.
search revealed no other incriminating items.

The

Swain then

transported Maycock to the Juab county jail where he was booked
(T. at 40).
After arguments by defense counsel, the trial court denied
Maycockfs motion to suppress (T. at 25). Then, on June 26, 1995,
Maycock was found guilty of possession of methamphetamine and
possession of drug paraphernalia as stated above.
On July 16, 1995, Maycock was sentenced on Count I to the
5

Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term not to exceed 5
years, plus pay a fine in the amount of $5,ooo; and on Count II
to the Juab County Jail for six (6) months.

Execution of the

sentence was suspended and Maycock was placed on probation for a
period of 36 months.

Thereafter, Maycock filed a timely notice

of appeal on October 10th, 1995.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The warrantless search of Maycock1s vehicle was conducted
without probable cause and was not justified by exigent
circumstances as required by the Utah and United States
Constitutions.

The

warrantless search was not supported by

probable cause because it did not reveal any evidence to
corroborate Swain's assertion that he smelled burnt marijuana
emanating from Maycock1s vehicle. Additionally, the search was
not justified by exigent circumstances because Swain could have
obtained a telephonic search warrant with relative ease but chose
not to do so.

Furthermore, the inevitable discovery doctrine

will not allow admission of the evidence because no impoundment
or inventory search would have been conducted but for the illegal
search of the vehicle and any subsequent inventory search is
therefore tainted by the preceding constitutional violation.
Therefore, the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence.
Wherefore, Maycock urges this court to reverse the trial court's
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denial of his motion to suppress the evidence and his conviction.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
SWAIN LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE OR REASONABLE SUSPICION TO
SEARCH BECAUSE THE VEHICLE DID NOT CONTAIN MARIJUANA AS
ALLEGED BY THE OFFICER AND THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY
DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS SITUATION.

A.

Standard

of

Review

In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress,
this court accords no deference to the trial courts legal
conclusions and reviews them for correctness. State v. Beavers,
859 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1993).

However, this court will

disturb the trial court's factual findings only if clearly
erroneous. Id.

B. Erroneous Finding and Conclusion on Probable Cause Requires
Reversal.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
requires that all searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant
based on probable cause.

See U.S. Const, amend. IV.

A

warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless the government
shows that the search falls within a recognized exception such as
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valid consent. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474
(1971).

"The security of one's privacy against arbitrary

intrusion by the police is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is
basic to a free society." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, (1984).
To give effect to the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures and to deter illegal police
conduct, the court must apply the exclusionary rule and suppress
any evidence unconstitutionally obtained.
U.S. 431, (1984).

Nix v. Williams, 467

The government has the burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence that a warrantless search meets the
requirements of an exception to the warrant requirement. Coolidge
403 U.S. 443 at 455.
The trial court found that probable cause existed to search
Maycock's car based solely upon Swain's testimony that he smelled
an odor of burnt marijuana emanating from the car after he
stopped Maycock for failing to display a license plate on the front of his car.

The issue of whether or not an officer of the

law has probable cause to search a vehicle based solely upon the
alleged smell of marijuana emanating from the vehicle after the
vehicle has been lawfully stopped is not a novel one.
This court addressed precisely the same issue in State v.
Naisbitt, 827 P.2d 969, 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

In that case,

after stopping the defendant for a traffic violation, the officer
involved testified that he smelled the odor of burnt marijuana
emanating from the defendant's car.
8

He then searched and found a

who might seek to circumvent the requirements of the Fourth

Amendment by claiming
a

to smell

marijuana

as the basis

to

conduct

warrantless search when in fact no such smell of marijuana

existed and the assertion was falsely made as a pretext to
justify a warrantless search.
To hold that the warrantless search of a vehicle based on
the alleged smell of marijuana emanating from that vehicle is
lawful even in the absence of any corroborating evidence revealed
by the search would be to set a dangerous precedent endangering
the principles for which the Fourth Amendment stands - "The
security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the
police which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment - is basic to
a free society" Wolf 338 U.S. 25 at 27.
This court is not alone in it's concern that the Fourth
Amendment would be endangered if no corroboration were required
to justify a warrantless search based solely on the alleged smell
of marijuana.

In United States v. Nielsen 9 f.3d 1487 (10th Cir.

1993), the Circuit Court invalidated the search and seizure of
evidence in the trunk of the appellant's car.

In that case, a

search of the passenger area of the car based solely on the
trooper's alleged smell of burnt marijuana emanating from that
area revealed no marijuana to corroborate the Trooper's
assertion.

Nonetheless, the Trooper searched the trunk of the

appellant's car against his will and discovered cocaine.

The

court reasoned that although the smell of burnt marijuana might
10

lead to a belief that the passenger compartment contained
marijuana, a search of that area had not revealed any marijuana
and that under the circumstances there was no fair probability
that the trunk contained marijuana, _Id at 1491.
In it's discussion of whether the alleged smell of marijuana
is sufficient to support probable cause to

conduct a warrantless

search of a vehicle, the court noted:

We have made unqualified statements that the smell of marijuana is
sufficient to establish probable cause to search. In all of the cases in
our circuit however, the search itself established the validity of the
smell. In all of the searches pursuant to the smell, marijuana was
found in the area it would be expected to be found. The case before us
is the first in which there was no corroboration of the smell. If this
were a case of an alert by a trained drug sniffing dog with a good
record, we would not require corroboration to establish probable cause,
The dog would have no reason to make a false alert. But for a human
sniffer, an officer with an incentive to find illegal activities and to
justify his actions when he had searched without consent, we believe
constitutional rights are endangered when limitations are not imposed.

Id.
To hold that Swain's alleged smell of burnt marijuana
provided probable cause to search the vehicle even though the
search revealed no corroborating evidence would jeopardize the
constitutional protections that the court expressed concern about
in Nielsen and "would open the door to snooping and rummaging
through personal effects.

Even a most acute sense of smell might

mislead officers into fruitless invasions of privacy where no
contraband is found." People v. Marshall, 442 P.2d 665, 671 (Cal.
1968).
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Most importantly however, to hold that Swain1s warrantless
search based on the alleged smell of marijuana was lawful in the
absence of any corroborating evidence of marijuana revealed by
the search would be to encourage arbitrary, warrantless
intrusions into the privacy of citizens by the police.

Because

Swain's warrantless search of appellant's vehicle based on the
alleged odor of burnt marijuana revealed no evidence to
corroborate Swain's assertion, the search was conducted without
probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the
evidence should have been suppressed by the trial court.
The trial court erroneously sustained the search under the
inevitable discovery doctrine on the theory that the car would
have been impounded and the evidence revealed during an inventory
search.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 41-la-1101, vehicles operated

with improper registration may be impounded.

In the instant case

however, the trial record reflects no testimony by Trooper Swain
that the vehicle was improperly registered.

Swain testified that

he stopped the appellant because no license plate was displayed
on the front of his car (T. 10). Swain then testified that he
asked to see the appellant's drivers license and registration (T.
12).

The testimony regarding Swain's verification of the

vehicles registration is as follows:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:

Okay. What did you do next?
Well, I got his drivers license and registration and I asked
Mr. Maycock to exit the vehicle.
Did you look at the registration at that time?
I don't remember.
Did you have a chance to look at it later on?
12

A:
Q:
A:

I'm sure I did.
Who was the vehicle registered to?
To Mr. Jarvis Maycock

(P.H. at 6)2

The testimony of trooper Swain does not indicate that there
was any defect in the vehicle's registration.

Indeed, it

indicates that the vehicle was validly registered to the
appellant.

Utah Code Ann. 41-la-404 requires that vehicles must

display license plates in the front and back of the vehicle.

The

statute does not state that a vehicle may be impounded if a
license plate is missing.

Neither does Utah Code Ann. 41-la-1101

indicate that a missing license plate is a defect in registration
of a vehicle. Moreover, the trial record reflects no testimony
by trooper Swain that a missing front license plate provided any
basis to impound the vehicle.
While a front license plate on the appellant's vehicle was
not displayed, Swain's testimony indicates that the vehicle was
properly registered to the appellant and a missing license plate
should be construed merely as a defect in display rather than a
defect in the vehicle's registration allowing impoundment of the
vehicle.

2 "(P.R )" indicates preliminary hearing transcript.
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Finally, the trial record reflects no testimony by Trooper
Swain regarding whether he would have impounded the car, nor
regarding any procedure or policy that would have governed an
impoundment and inventory search.
Because there is no evidentiary basis to support the
conclusions of the trial court, and because no inventory of
appellant's vehicle would have occurred but for the illegal
search, the evidence cannot be admissible under the inevitable
discovery doctrine.

See generally Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431

(1984)(discussing inevitable discovery doctrine).
In

United States v. Ibarra, 955 F.2d 1405, 1408-1409 (10th

Cir. 1992), the Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit ruled that
evidence seized during an invalid impound search was not
admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine because but
for the unlawful impound, no inventory search would have
occurred.
The instant case presents a situation which is substantially
similar and equally as problematic.

As discussed above, the

warrantless search of appellant's vehicle violated the Fourth
Amendment and the evidence it revealed must be suppressed.

It is

also clear that no impound or inventory search of appellant's
vehicle would have been conducted but for the illegal search.

It

follows that any inventory search of the vehicle would be tainted
by the Fourth Amendment violation and the inevitable discovery
doctrine cannot operate to remove the taint.
14

In order to be justified, an inventory search must comply
with standard police procedures and not exceed the bounds of a
normal inventory search. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367;
United States v. Lugo, 978 F.2d 631, 636-637 (10th Cir. 1992);
State v. Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425 (Utah App. 1988).

No testimony

has been offered to show what procedure is followed by the Utah
Highway Patrol with respect to inventory searches or even to
establish that a set of procedures exists.

Moreover, no evidence

has been offered that the Utah Highway patrol follows a procedure
of taking an inventory of the pockets of an article of clothing
found in a search as opposed to simply recording an inventory of
the article of clothing itself.
Because the state has failed to prove that an inventory
search would have revealed the evidence, it cannot rely on the
inevitable discovery doctrine to allow admission of the evidence.
See State v.Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah 1995)(requiring
government to show "established reasonable procedure for
safeguarding impounded vehicles and their contents and that the
challenged police activity was essentially in conformance with
that procedure" in order to justify search as inventory search
under South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S 364 (1976) .

POINT II
THE SEARCH WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE NO EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED
TO JUSTIFY A WARRANTLESS SEARCH.
15

A.

Standard

of

review

In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress,
this court accords no deference to the trial courts legal
conclusions and reviews them for correctness. State v. Beavers,
859 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1993).

However, this court will

disturb the trial court's factual findings only if clearly
erroneous. Id.

B. Lack of exigent
search requires

circumstances
reversal

needed

to conduct

warrantless

Assuming arguendo that the search of appellant's vehicle was
supported by probable cause, the search was still invalid because
no exigent circumstances existed to justify the search.
Therefore, any evidence obtained must be suppressed.
The Supreme Court of Utah has interpreted Article 1, Section 14
of the Utah Constitution as providing Utah citizens with more
protection against warrantless search and seizure than the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. See State v.
Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 470-471 (Utah 1990) (requiring both
probable cause and exigent circumstances to conduct a warrantless
search of a vehicle.

Search of automobile parked in front of

home was invalidated because no exigent circumstances existed to
justify

warrantless search).

In basing it's decision on the

16

state Constitution, the court reasoned:

..the high degree of government regulation does not support the excessive diminution
of Fourth Amendment protection of the automobile which accompanies application of the
automobile exception.

^d. at 469.

In determining that a warrantless search was not justified,
the court relied on the ease with which a telephonic warrant may
be obtained in Utah:

Recognizing the delay that is often incurred in procuring a warrant, Utah has
adopted a procedure whereby warrants may be issued over the telephone. Section 7723-4(2)3 of the Utah code allows for the issuance of a search warrant based on the
sworn telephonic statement of the officer seeking the warrant, provided that the
statement is properly recorded and transcribed.

Id. at 470.

The reasoning of the court in Larocco is no less persuasive
in the instant case. Moreover, it seems clear that the Utah
legislature provided a mechanism for obtaining telephonic search
warrants in order to discourage warrantless searches by making it
easier for police to obtain search warrants in situations such as

3 Utah Code Ann.77-23-4 (2) 3 h a s b e e n r e n u m b e r e d t o Utah Code Ann.
17

77-23-204.

roadside vehicle stops where warrants were previously difficult
to obtain.
In the instant case, Trooper Swain testified that his radio
did not have the capability of being patched through to court
officers or judges who might have granted a search warrant (T.
16).

While this assertion is questionable at best, it seems

clear that Swain could have called his dispatch and had a sworn
statement recorded or transcribed by someone of authority there
who could then contact a judge or court officer and obtain a
search warrant. See Utah Code Ann. 77-23-204 (The sworn oral
testimony may be communicated to the magistrate by telephone or
other appropriate means...).

In the alternative, Swain could

have radioed for another Highway Patrol officer to secure
appellant's vehicle while Swain drove to a phone and obtained a
warrant telephonically.
As this court noted in a recent case:
..the need for an immediate search must be apparent to the police, and so
strong as to outweigh the important protection of individual rights provided
by the warrant requirement.
State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 18 (Utah App. 1993) .

This court has also stated: .

We must first clarify that the plain view doctrine and its corollary "plain
smell" theory do not in and of themselves provide an exception to the
requirement of obtaining a valid search warrant.
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State v. South/ 885 P.2d 795 (Utah App. 1994) .

The instant case does not present a situation in which
exigent circumstances justify a warrantless search of appellant's
vehicle.

Trooper Swain had the ability to obtain a search

warrant telephonically with relative ease and simply chose not to
do so.

See State v. Palmer, 67 6 P.2d 393 (Utah Ct. App.

1990)(warrantless search of defendant's body by X-ray because
police believed he had swallowed a diamond ring was held invalid
where officers could have obtained a telephonic search warrant
with relative ease and failed to do so).
Based on the foregoing, evidence seized from Maycock's
vehicle should have been suppressed by the trial court.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
The trial court erred in holding that the warrantless search
of Maycock's vehicle, which was conducted without probable cause
or justified by exigent circumstances, did not violate the
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.

As such, the trial

court erroneously denied Maycock's motion to suppress the
evidence and his conviction should therefore be reversed.

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
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Oral argument is desired in this case as the issues
presented are novel, and oral argument will aid the Court in
disposing of them.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s - ^ ^ " o f January, 1996.

STANLEY S. ADAMS
Attorney for Appellant
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I hereby declare that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Brief For The Appellant postage prepaid, this
day of January, 1996, to Barney Madsen, Assistant Attorney
General, at 160 East 300 South, Suite 600, P.O. Box# 140854, Salt
Lake City, UT 84111.
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